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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 22/01/2004 Accident number: 37 
Accident time: 09:50 Accident Date: 10/07/1995 




Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Vegetation removal 
accident 
Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: ADP-4/ TL/JS Name of source: ADP/CND/IND 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: OZM-3 or 4 AP Bfrag Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created: 22/01/2004 Date  last modified: 22/01/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 25° 56' 31" E Latitude: 31° 59' 19" S 
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
request for clearance with explosive charge (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 




An internal investigation was carried out by the UN Technical Advisors. The report was made 
available and the following summarises its content. As the victim was killed, a Board of Inquiry 
was established.  
The investigators stated that at 09:50 on 10th July 1995 Victim No.2 initiated an OZM-3 that 
was behind a tree. He heard the "click" and threw himself to the ground suffering minor 
abrasions. "The mine may not have reached its intended height on detonation". Victim No.2 
was not significantly injured despite being less than two metres from the blast. Victim No.1, 
another deminer working 31 metres from the accident, was struck by a single fragment in the 
neck causing fatal injuries. 
Deminers had been seen clearing the overgrown area by pulling branches away. Victim No.2 
had a broken branch (not cut) in his hand after the accident. The shears that he did not use  
"were not as sharp as they could have been". The directive to cut rather than break branches 
was not in the SOPs but the investigators considered it well known. They stated that "there is 
a noted shortfall in either the ability or the desire of the Platoon and Section commanders… to 
impose the required standards upon the deminers". Leadership training was suggested to 
give the leaders "the moral courage to discipline their comrades". 
Medevac facilities failed - arrangements for helicopter evacuation by SabinAir were 
unexpectedly unavailable. The victim was loaded into a pickup for evacuation by road but 
died at 10.30. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigation recommended that "ballistic protection" fragmentation jackets and protective 
helmets be available for areas with a "high threat level". The issue of search mirrors for 
checking behind trees was also suggested. Three methods of clearing dense undergrowth 
prior to demining were suggested. These were burning, defoliation and the "use of concrete 
improvised Claymore type devices" [!]. Other recommendations included following tripwires to 
their full extent, improved training for the relevant terrain, and that no further work go on at the 
site without special training. 
Another UN Technical Advisor commented at length on errors in the investigation of this 
accident on 26th July. He claimed the mine was an OZM-4. He stated that "the benefits of 
safety equipment are offset by more risky behaviour", and said that "closer attention to detail 




Victim number: 53 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: US$6,600 Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: not recorded 
 






No medical report was made available. The victim died 40 minutes after the accident. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 54 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 




No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the group were not supplied with appropriate tools by its management. The secondary cause 
is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The researcher visited the site in 1995 and was shown the relative positions of the victims. 
Safety distances on the site had obviously been ignored because witnesses were between 
the two victims when the accident occurred. Victim No.1 was actually outside the mined area 
at the time. 
The supervisor training needs that were identified during the investigation are another 
management failing, along with the squabbling between Technical Advisors.   
Related papers 
One of the investigators commented in correspondence with the researcher (4th September 
1998): "Basically a deminer had pulled a branch too hard, the branch had snagged a tripwire 
and sent an OZM-3 into the air. He was a metre away from the mine wearing a pair of 
[demining group] specs. Fortunately, there was a tree in-between him and the mine and when 
he heard the mine go up in the air, he dived for the floor and escaped without a scratch. His 
mate in the next lane, 32m away, was not so lucky. Similarly equipped he took one small 
fragment through the back of his neck which killed him within two minutes…." 
Compensation: on death the deminer was due 60x monthly salary of 110$ so US$6,600. 
The Officer in Charge of the group at the time issued a directive on 10th July 1995 stating that 
clearance at the site was to be suspended pending a refresher course. That course would 
cover investigation of all detector alarms, use of marking tape and lane markers and the need 
to clear steep slopes uphill. Deminers were to be told that speed must never compromise 
safety – no competition or pressure "to prove their value" must be allowed. Meantime staff 
were to assess alternative means of clearance in areas of "close country" with an "abundance 
of tripwires". Commanders and Supervisors were to be told to enforce safety distances, 
especially when tripwires are found. A leadership training package was to be developed to 
make continual enforcement of discipline easier. 
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